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I. Introduction
On 29 November 2017, the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party (WP29) adopted its ‘Opinion on some
key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU
2016/680)’1. The Law Enforcement Directive (LED)2,
which is a lex specialis to the more prominent Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)3,
will have to be transposed into national legislation by
6 May 2018. It thereby repeals Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA4 that is applicable to cross-border pro-
cessing of personal data by competent law enforce-
mentauthorities.Thescopeof theLEDismuchbroad-
er than the one of the Framework Decision, as the Di-
rective isapplicable forall typesofprocessingbycom-
petent authorities for the purposes of the prevention,
investigation, detectionorprosecutionof criminal of-
fences whereas the Framework Decision was limited
to the specific category of cross-border processing. In
addition, the Directive strengthens the rights of data
subjects and provides for new obligations imposed
on controllers. However, since theDirectivewill leave
a certain margin of discretion to the Member States
when transposing it, and because the 28 criminal jus-
tice systems are not harmonised, the application of
its scope may differ, due to the varying definitions of
criminal offences or competent authorities, and the
different competences provided to the latter.
Several provisions in the LED leave room for in-
terpretation by national legislators, which could
hamper the harmonisation of data protection stan-
dards in the area of law enforcement. Against this
background, the WP29 Opinion of November 2017,
emphasize several key issues of the LED, particular-
ly focussing on the role of Data Protection Authori-
ties (DPAs), data subject rights, obligations for con-
trollers and aspects where the Directive might leave
room for Member States to transpose the LED in a
different manner than anticipated. The guidance
provided by theWP29 addresses Article 5 (time lim-
its for storage and review), Article 10 (processing of
special categories of personal data), Article 11 (auto-
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1 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion on some key
issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680)’ (29
November 2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item
-detail.cfm?item_id=610178> accessed 2 March 2018 (WP29
Opinion).
2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation,
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L
119/89.
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119/1.
4 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November
2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the frame-
work of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L
350/60.
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mated individual decisionmaking andprofiling), Ar-
ticles 13 to 17 (rights of the data subject), Article 25
(logging) and Article 47 (powers of the data protec-
tion authorities) of the LED. In doing so, it seeks to
encourage a consistent interpretation of key defini-
tions, to prompt national legislators to further deter-
mine certain elements in their national laws and to
clarify both the role of controllers in granting data
subjects rights as well as the powers of DPAs to ef-
fectively control the enforcement of these rights.
II. Points of Concern Mentioned in the
Opinion
1. Overview
On the whole, both assessment and recommenda-
tions regarding the key issues of the LED presented
by the WP29 Opinion endorse an approach that is
favourable towards high data protection standards.
The Working Party calls on national legislators to
foresee the implementation of coherent rules and to
further define provisions in domains where uncer-
tainties remain. Particularly with regard to data sub-
ject rights and effective powers of national DPAs, the
WP29 seeks to set clear limits on the margin of dis-
cretion that national legislators might use to grant
controllers more flexibility when processing person-
al data within the scope of the LED, as will be shown
in more detail below. TheWP29 proposes clear rules
on retention periods (Article 5) and provides guid-
ance on how to implement the logging requirement
under Article 25.
Regarding Article 10, the WP29 suggests several
measures that are to be welcomed, for instance, the
performanceof aDataProtection ImpactAssessment
(DPIA), or the prior consultation of the national DPA
when processing special categories of data.
Concerning the recommendations on automated
individual decision-making and profiling under Ar-
ticle 11, the Opinion seems rather vague with regard
to certain aspects where the WP29 does not further
clarify the scope of human intervention and omits
guidance on how to effectively enforce the rights
mentioned under Recital (38) in practice. Neverthe-
less, the Opinion endorses surprisingly strong safe-
guards for data subjects and urges controllers to car-
ry out a DPIA in connection with automated deci-
sions.
To ensure the effectiveness of Articles 13 to 17, the
WP29 suggests interpreting the provisions in favour
of strong data subject rights, enforceable obligations
for controllers and seeks to set limits to possible lim-
itations under Article 13(3) and (4) and Article 15.
With regard to Article 47, the WP29 urges Mem-
ber States to foresee effective and enforceable pow-
ers for national supervisory authorities and to com-
bine the monitoring of both Directive and GDPR un-
der the competence of one single DPA in order to en-
sure consistent data protection standards.
It is, however, regrettable that the WP29 neither
discusses the scope of the LED in comparison to the
GDPR nor goes into detail concerning the transfer of
personal data to third countries further than within
thecontextof effectivepowersof supervisoryauthor-
ities.
2. Article 5 on Time-Limits for Storage
and Review
Theguidanceprovidedby theWP29concerning time
limits for storage and review for the erasure of per-
sonal data, and in particular the recommendation to
introduce a mixed system that includes both maxi-
mum retention periods and regular review of the ne-
cessity for storage, should certainly be taken into ac-
count by national legislators.Where the Directive al-
lows for more flexibility and leaves Member States
the choice to introduce either time limits or period-
ic review, the WP29 proposes a much stricter ap-
proach.Here, theWorkingParty endorses a transpar-
ent assessment of the need for continued retention5,
procedural measures to ensure a data quality review
with the involvement of the Data Protection Officer
(DPO) and comprehensible documentation of proce-
dural measures that is to be provided to the DPA.6
Adjusting storage periods along different types of
crimes and carrying out a risk assessment where da-
ta is retained for preventive purposes should be ap-
plied as an expedient tool to determine the least in-
trusive measure and to ensure fair processing.
5 The WP29 underlines that where data stored for preventive
purposes are to be retained for a prolonged period, such decision
should always be accompanied by a risk assessment of the re-
spective data subject and include the same safeguards as the ones
regarding continued retention mentioned above. Such assessment
is not to be confused with a DPIA.
6 WP29 Opinion (n 1) 4.
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The introduction of technical measures for the au-
tomatic deletion or anonymisation of personal data
after themaximum storage period would ensure that
data are not subsequently processed for purposes in-
compatible with the initial purpose for processing
and would be in line with the data protection by de-
sign principle under Article 20 and the storage limi-
tation principle pursuant to Article 4(1)(e). In order
toensureeffectivedeletionanderasureafter themax-
imum storage period, the WP29 recommends mak-
ing statistical information on deletion and erasure
available to both DPO and DPA on request and advis-
es controllers to define, jointly with their DPO, relat-
ed procedural measures.7 These suggestions are im-
portant in order to ensure thatMember States imple-
ment the technical and procedural measures to guar-
antee compliance with necessary retention periods.
3. Article 10 on Processing of Special
Categories of Personal Data
It is to be welcomed that the WP29 suggests a DPIA
and, by reference to Recital 37, the provision of addi-
tional safeguards for the processing of special cate-
gories of data, since the processing of such data al-
ways bears high risks for the rights and freedoms of
data subjects, particularly in the area covered by the
Directive. Accordingly, the WP29 recognizes that the
processingofspecial categoriesofdatawithin thecon-
text of the LED might lead to even higher risks than
within the scope of the GDPR, although the Directive,
contrary to the GDPR, does not generally prohibit the
processing of special categories of personal data.
TheWP emphasises the interrelation betweenAr-
ticle 10 andArticle 8 (lawfulness of processing) of the
Directive and thereby clarifies the somewhat mis-
leading wording of Article 10. Limiting the possibil-
ities to process special categories of data to certain
types of crime or to only allow their processing in
cases of urgency seems very reasonable. This option
should be reinforced by prior judicial authorisation,
stricter technical measures, particularly high securi-
ty standards, and additional access authorisation re-
quirements, as suggested by the WP29.8
Moreover, theWP29 stresses thatwhere voluntary
agreement9 by the data subject is used as additional
safeguard to process special categories of data, the
data subject must be informed in a clear and unam-
biguous manner by the controller and, with refer-
ence to Article 7(3) GDPR, be able to withdraw his or
her agreement at any time.10Although it is to be wel-
comed that the WP29 requires that data subjects
should be able to withdraw their voluntary agree-
ment for the processing of special categories of per-
sonal data at any time, this could be misleading, as
voluntary agreement can never present a legal basis
under the Directive and the controllermay neverthe-
less decide to continue processing these data based
on the other applicable reason for processing. Still,
any withdrawal of such voluntary agreement might
lead to a re-assessment of the respective processing
operation and could, for instance, lead to a decision
in favour of less intrusive measures.
4. Article 11 on Automated Individual
Decision-Making
With regard to the clarifications on Article 11, the
WP29 greatly focuses on profiling, although the pro-
vision principally addresses automated individual
decision-making and solely includes profiling where
the latter is part of such automated processing.
Besides giving several examples for ‘adverse’ legal
effects and ‘significantly affecting the data subject’,
theWP29 does not assess the provision in depth: the
Working Party neither clearly defines the scope of
human intervention, nor enters into a discussion
concerning situations in which no decision is being
taken after automated processing measures.
In that regard, it is regrettable that the Opinion
does not provide further guidance as to the moment
where human intervention can be seen as ‘true in-
tervention’ andwhether it should always be required
ex ante in a pre-assessment of the automated pro-
cessing system via a DPIA, or ex post, after a decision
was taken and is contested by the data subject.
On the other hand, theWP29 goes rather farwhen
suggesting to grant data subjects similar rights as the
ones under the GDPR and when determining how
human involvement should be carried out. It is in-
7 WP29 Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement
Directive (EU 2016/680) 4.
8 ibid 8.
9 In the context of the LED, consent as safeguard is called ‘volun-
tary agreement’ in order to not confuse it with consent as a
legal basis under the GDPR.
10 ibid 9.
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deed very commendable that theWP29 requires hu-
man intervention to be significant and to be per-
formed by a person who is able to understand the
decision-making process and to explain the result to
the data subject.Whether it is realistic to require con-
trollers to provide for someone who is proficient
enough tounderstand theunderlying algorithmsand
who has the capacity to change the decision taken
concerning a data subject, is debatable. Moreover, in
practice this standard would probably be difficult to
implement, as in automated systems, the algorithms
are often protected by intellectual property rights. In
that regard, theWP29 could have given further clar-
ification as to what should be included in the expla-
nation to be given to the data subject.11 It might be
exaggerated to assume that data subjects will be pro-
vided with an extensive explanation, the possibility
to express their point of view on specific results and
to challenge the decision in all cases, also because
these options are solely mentioned in the (non-bind-
ing) recitals of the LED. Especially where profiling is
carried out for preventive purposes, the scope of Ar-
ticles 13(3)(b) and 15(1)(b) as limitations to the right
of access and information and Recital 1212 might be
underestimated in that regard.
The connection of Article 27 with Article 13(2)(d)
and the advice to carry out a DPIA prior to process-
ing operations under Article 11 could increase the
transparency and thus, accountability of automated
decisions. The same applies for the prior consulta-
tion of the national DPA where decisions are based
solely on automated processing. The question of
whether these options could count as human inter-
vention remains open.
It would be useful to clarify the transparency re-
quirements where no decision was taken after auto-
mated processing took place andwhere results of the
automatedprocessingoperations areused for further
decision-making under Article 11. Such use could ex-
acerbate the effects on the data subject and would,
within a strict interpretation of Article 11, not require
human intervention unless processing is carried out
for decision-making purposes. Here, further clarifi-
cation could be derived from Article 16(2), which re-
quires the erasure of personal data where data was
obtained from processing which infringes the prin-
ciple of fairness relating to the processing of person-
al data under Articles 4 LED.
Finally, thewording on the prohibition of discrim-
inatory profiling where such processing is based on
special categories of personal data is (not only in the
WP29 Opinion) deficient, as the creation of profiles
resulting in discrimination on the basis of any type
of data is prohibited. This wording is misleading un-
der the LED and should have been further clarified
by the WP29.
5. Articles 13 to 17 on Rights of the Data
Subject
With regard to the right to information enshrined in
Article 13 LED, the WP29 point to the difference be-
tween ‘making available’ and ‘give’ information to
the data subject, which is crucial when considering
general processing operations and processing that
affects particular individuals. Such differentiation
obliges controllers tomake general information pub-
licly available under Article 13(1) and to give specif-
ic information to data subjects in certain cases de-
fined by law under Article 13(2).13
The WP29 extensively addresses the right to rec-
tification or erasure of personal data and the right to
restrict processing under Article 16, thereby empha-
sising that the list to claim erasure underArticle 16(2)
should be regarded as being non-exhaustive and da-
ta subjects should be able to request the erasure of
their personal data in additional situations.
The WP29 sets strict requirements for the limita-
tions of data subject rights, repeatedly reminds na-
tional legislators that the rights under Articles 13, 14,
16 and 17 may only be restricted in exceptional cas-
es, and that controllersmust alwaysprovidedata sub-
jects with adequate information concerning limita-
tions as well as the additional possibilities to have
their rights exercised indirectly or to lodge a com-
plaint with the DPA. In that regard, a listing obliga-
tion of processing operations and situations inwhich
11 On this issue of the right to explanation under the GDPR, cf:
Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a
Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7(2)
International Data Privacy Law 76–99.
12 The wording of the Recital is: ‘[A]ctivities carried out by the
police or other law-enforcement authorities also include main-
taining law and order as a task conferred on the police or other
law-enforcement authorities where necessary to safeguard against
and prevent threats to public security and to fundamental inter-
ests of the society protected by law which may lead to a criminal
offence’.
13 29WP Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement
Directive (EU 2016/680) 17.
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controllers would not be able to decline the right to
erasure or rectification would reinforce accountabil-
ity towards the data subject. Moreover, the introduc-
tion of an autonomous right to the restriction of pro-
cessing would strengthen the means of data subjects
where the accuracy or completeness of data is con-
tested.
The new possibility for data subjects to exercise
their rights indirectly through the DPA is a further
step to make controllers accountable towards data
subjects and should be foreseen as stand-alone pro-
vision innational legislation.However, theWP29 rec-
ommendationforcontrollersandsupervisoryauthor-
ities to document indirect access requests in registers
in order to keep track of them and for statistical pur-
poses remains rather unclear, as the WP29 neither
specifieswhether these registers shall includeperson-
al data, nor how long such registers should be kept.14
6. Article 25 on Logging
TheWP29 considers the logging requirement under
Article 25 to be crucial on the one hand to prevent
unauthorised access or use of personal data and, on
the other, to serve as means to prosecute any abusive
use of data. Pursuant to the data protection by de-
sign principle, any automated processing system
shouldcustomarily require thecreationof logswhen-
ever data is being processed within the scope of the
LED.15To that end, theWP29 recommends that every
person consulting personal data processed in an au-
tomated processing system should automatically be
subject to the logging obligation, irrespective of
whether the individual is directly involved in pro-
cessing the personal data for the purposes of Article
1(1) LED, or needs to access the data eg for the pur-
pose of system maintenance.16
Since Article 25 LED does not lay down further re-
quirements regarding the content of logs or their
storage periods, the requirement to specify these el-
ements under national law, preferably on a case-by-
case basis, is imperative. For that objective, theWP29
recommends an alignment of retention periods with
the purposes of the respective logs and, where nec-
essary, to consider the archiving of logs. Thus, a log
that serves self-monitoring purposes on accessmight
require shorter retention periods than logs that were
created for the investigation of criminal proceedings.
In addition, the WP29 acknowledges that in certain
situations logs might have to be kept for longer pe-
riods, as may be the case for processing for preven-
tive purposes. In any event, storage periods should
give supervisory authorities sufficient time for re-
view in accordance with Article 25(3).
With regard to the use of logs for criminal pro-
ceedings, theWP29 recalls that the purposes of logs,
eg the verification of the lawfulness of processing,
self-monitoring purposes, or ensuring the integrity
and security of the personal data, must be the under-
lying basis for the use of logs in criminal proceed-
ings.17 Consequently, logs may solely be used in or-
der to investigate unlawful processing, to monitor
processing by staff and to prosecute unauthorized
access or other data and security breaches, as any use
going beyond these purposes would be excessive.
Finally, national legislation shoulddefine the tech-
nical measures, procedures for self-auditing and in-
ternal policies that will be required for an appropri-
ate use of logs.18
7. Article 47 on Powers of the
Supervisory Authorities
With regard to Article 47 LED, the WP29 acknowl-
edges that, unlike the GDPR, the Directive does not
provide for a detailed definition of the investigative,
corrective and advisory powers of supervisory au-
thorities. In order for them to be effective and en-
forceable, the WP29 suggests granting DPAs similar
powers as the ones under the GDPR to ensure a com-
parable level of protection.19 The WP29 further
points to the necessity that all powers granted to the
DPAs must be equally strong and binding, as other-
wise their effectiveness would be insufficient.20 In
14 ibid 24.
15 ibid 26.
16 ibid 25.
17 ibid 27.
18 ibid 26.
19 WP29 Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement
Directive (EU 2016/680) 30.
20 In the view of the WP29, a lack of corrective powers cannot be
compensated by foreseeing the power to bring infringements to
the attention of judicial authorities and, where appropriate, to
commence or otherwise engage in legal proceedings, as required
by art 47(5). Such legal proceedings are supposed to be addition-
al instruments and not alternative instruments to effective correc-
tive powers. WP29 Opinion on some key issues of the Law
Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680) 30.
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order to increase their independence, it makes sense
to provide DPAs with strong powers under both
GDPR and the Directive to avoid tensions between
operational requirements and acceptable data pro-
tection standards.21
Moreover, theWP29 suggests, in accordance with
the financial capabilities and constitutional structure
of the Member States, to establish one DPA to mon-
itor the application of both the Directive and the
GDPR, instead of entrusting two separate authorities
for the monitoring of each instrument.22 One single
supervisory authority for both GDPR and LED could
contribute to a more consistent interpretation of the
rules and lead to a coherent approach regarding da-
ta protection policies and practices.
III. Conclusion
21 Paul De Hert and Juraj Sajfert, ‘The role of the data protection
authorities in supervising police and criminal justice authorities
processing personal data’ in Chloé Brière and Anne Weyembergh
(eds), The needed balances in EU Criminal Law: past present and
future (Hart Publishing 2017) 243-255.
22 WP29 Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement
Directive (EU 2016/680) 30.
